One Version of the Truth: Why Disconnected Care Systems Are Creating New Risk

Adult social care has become significantly more digital.

As of March 2026, an estimated 83.7% of CQC-registered provider locations in England had a digital social care record, covering approximately 92% of people receiving regulated care.

But the digital care record is rarely the only system a provider operates.

A single organisation may now use separate platforms for:

• care planning;
• daily records;
• electronic medicines administration;
• rostering;
• recruitment;
• HR;
• payroll;
• learning and competence;
• incidents;
• safeguarding;
• quality assurance;
• finance;
• family communication;
• and management reporting.

The 2025 national technology survey reflects this expanding digital estate. Among respondents, digital social care records and rostering were the most common business-management technologies, while substantial numbers also used eMAR, HR and financial-accounting software.

Each system may perform an important function.

The risk begins when they operate as separate versions of the same service.

A person’s medicine changes in one system but not another.

A new risk is entered into the care plan but does not reach the rostering or handover process.

An employee leaves, but their access remains active across platforms that are managed separately.

An incident is recorded but does not trigger the relevant training, care-plan review or provider-level quality action.

A manager prepares a dashboard by manually transferring figures from several sources, each using different definitions and reporting periods.

The organisation may appear to hold more information than ever before.

But it may have less confidence about which information is correct.

The greatest digital risk is not always missing data. It is several systems presenting different versions of the truth.

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Digital Adoption Has Created a New Integration Challenge

The first phase of digital transformation concentrated on moving individual processes away from paper.

Providers selected:

• one system for care records;
• another for medicines;
• another for rotas;
• and additional platforms as new operational needs emerged.

This was often sensible.

Specialist systems can provide deeper functionality than one broad platform attempting to perform every task.

But the result can be a collection of technologies introduced at different times, purchased by different departments and managed by different people.

The systems may use:

• different employee identifiers;
• different service names;
• different definitions;
• different review dates;
• and different ways of recording the same event.

They may not exchange information automatically.

Where they do, the connection may be limited to only part of the required data.

That leaves employees and managers acting as the integration layer.

They copy information.

They reconcile differences.

They enter the same data repeatedly.

They email updates.

They maintain spreadsheets alongside the formal systems.

They rely on verbal handovers to close the remaining gaps.

The organisation may be digitally enabled while its information flow remains heavily manual.

This matters because every manual transfer introduces an opportunity for:

• delay;
• omission;
• duplication;
• misunderstanding;
• and error.

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What Does “One Version of the Truth” Mean?

One version of the truth does not necessarily mean forcing every activity into one software platform.

A care provider may legitimately need several specialist systems.

It means that, for every important piece of information, the organisation knows:

1. Which system is the authoritative source?
2. Who is responsible for keeping it current?
3. Which other systems need that information?
4. How and when will it be transferred?
5. How will conflicting information be identified?
6. Who acts when an inconsistency appears?

For example:

Medication information

The provider should know which source confirms:

• the currently prescribed medicine;
• the administration instructions;
• known allergies;
• the current MAR;
• PRN guidance;
• and recent changes.

Personal and care information

The provider should know which record holds:

• the person’s needs;
• preferences;
• communication;
• risks;
• capacity and consent information;
• outcomes;
• and current support instructions.

Workforce information

The provider should know which system confirms:

• whether the employee is currently employed;
• which services they can access;
• their role;
• training;
• assessed competence;
• availability;
• and permission to undertake specialist activities.

Incident and quality information

The organisation should know where:

• the event is first recorded;
• the investigation sits;
• actions are tracked;
• learning is shared;
• and the outcome reaches provider-level governance.

One version of the truth therefore means controlled information, not one enormous database.

It is an operating principle.

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Why Disconnection Creates Care Risk

1. Information Changes at Different Speeds

Care information is not static.

A person’s:

• medication;
• mobility;
• diet;
• communication;
• behaviour;
• mental capacity;
• clinical condition;
• risk;
• or preferred routine

may change quickly.

Where several systems hold overlapping information, one may be updated before the others.

For a period, two versions of the person exist digitally.

One employee may see the updated information.

Another may see yesterday’s position.

A third may rely on a printed document created before either change.

The issue is not simply data administration.

It can directly affect:

• medicines;
• nutrition;
• moving and handling;
• safeguarding;
• escalation;
• and emergency response.

CQC’s digital-record guidance emphasises that the right people need access to complete and current information and that, where digital and paper records operate together, they should be consistent. Good-quality electronic medicines records similarly depend on the right information being communicated clearly to the right people when they need it.

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2. Duplication Creates False Reassurance

When information is entered into several systems, completion can be mistaken for accuracy.

A medicine allergy may appear in:

• the care plan;
• the eMAR;
• the hospital-passport document;
• the risk assessment;
• and an emergency-information sheet.

Five completed records may look like strong evidence.

But if one contains outdated information, the organisation has increased the number of places where the error can cause harm.

Duplication creates three responsibilities:

• entering the information correctly;
• updating every version when it changes;
• and confirming that all copies remain consistent.

The more copies that exist, the more difficult that responsibility becomes.

A safer model is to define the authoritative source and allow other systems to receive or display that information in a controlled way.

Where duplication cannot be avoided, a clear reconciliation process is needed.

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3. Manual Re-entry Consumes Care and Management Time

Disconnected systems do not only create risk.

They create work.

Employees may enter the same information into:

• the care record;
• the medicine system;
• an incident form;
• a manager’s spreadsheet;
• and a commissioner report.

Managers may then compare several exports before producing one governance report.

The organisation is paying for multiple digital systems while still depending on manual administration to connect them.

The national What Good Looks Like framework describes effective digital working as making information available in the right place at the right time, supporting the workforce and improving care. It places “digitise, connect and transform” together because isolated digitisation is not enough.

Providers should therefore measure:

• repeated data entry;
• manual report preparation;
• reconciliation time;
• corrections;
• and unofficial spreadsheets created between systems.

These are not minor efficiency issues.

Every hour spent repairing the digital workflow is an hour unavailable for:

• supervision;
• quality improvement;
• staff support;
• and direct care.

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4. Important Events Fail to Trigger Wider Action

An incident may be recorded accurately in an incident-management platform.

But what happens next?

Does the event automatically or reliably lead to:

• a care-plan review;
• a risk-assessment update;
• staff supervision;
• competence reassessment;
• family communication;
• an eMAR review;
• safeguarding consideration;
• a governance action;
• and remeasurement?

Where systems are disconnected, each stage may depend on a different person remembering to complete it.

The incident system holds the event.

The care record holds the revised guidance.

The learning platform holds the training.

The action tracker holds the deadline.

The board report holds the theme.

Unless those elements are linked through technology or a dependable operating process, part of the response may be lost.

The organisation may be able to prove that an incident was recorded without being able to prove that learning changed practice.

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5. Dashboards Can Be Built on Conflicting Definitions

Provider-level reporting increasingly draws on information from several systems.

A dashboard may show:

• employee turnover;
• training compliance;
• incidents;
• medicines errors;
• missed visits;
• care-plan reviews;
• complaints;
• and outcomes.

But leaders need to understand how each measure was created.

For example:

• Does “staff turnover” include agency workers?
• Is training compliance measured by assignment, completion or assessed competence?
• Does one incident involving two people count once or twice?
• When is a care plan considered overdue?
• Is a missed visit recorded by the rostering system, care record or complaints process?
• Does the monthly report include events entered after the reporting deadline?

Where systems use different definitions, the dashboard can present apparent precision without genuine consistency.

A graph may show improvement because one system changed the way it categorised an event.

A service may appear to perform differently because records were entered more promptly.

Boards should therefore expect every important measure to have:

• a clear definition;
• an identified source;
• a named owner;
• a reporting frequency;
• and an explanation of known limitations.

Better reporting is not created by adding more data.

It is created by making the data trustworthy.

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A Practical Example: The Hospital Discharge

Consider a person returning to a care home after hospital treatment.

The discharge information includes:

• a changed medicine;
• a new wound-care instruction;
• reduced mobility;
• and a follow-up appointment.

The provider may need to update:

• the digital care record;
• eMAR;
• risk assessments;
• moving-and-handling guidance;
• the rota or staffing allocation;
• clinical monitoring;
• the family communication log;
• and the appointment system.

Where each platform operates separately, the update depends on several steps being completed manually.

A failure at any point may mean:

• the medicine is administered incorrectly;
• staff use outdated mobility guidance;
• the appointment is missed;
• or night staff remain unaware of the change.

Joined-up health and care policy is intended to make current information available across organisational boundaries. NHS England describes interoperability as the standards and arrangements allowing different systems to connect and share information safely. The stated benefits include better-informed decisions, fewer errors caused by limited information, reduced duplication and smoother transitions between care settings.

But external interoperability does not remove the provider’s internal responsibility.

Receiving a discharge summary digitally is valuable only when the information reaches every relevant part of the care operation.

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A Practical Example: The New Falls Risk

A person experiences two near falls over one weekend.

Employees record the events in the care system.

The manager decides that the person requires:

• a mobility review;
• an occupational-therapy referral;
• increased observation;
• and a change to night-time support.

But the rostering system does not show the additional requirement.

The risk assessment is updated, but the handover template continues displaying the previous version.

The incident dashboard shows two events.

The quality report does not identify the developing pattern because the incidents were recorded under slightly different categories.

Every individual system is functioning.

The service is still at risk.

This illustrates why digital maturity depends on information flow rather than system count.

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A Practical Example: Workforce Competence

A care worker completes medicines training.

The learning platform marks the course complete.

The manager later assesses their competence and identifies that further support is needed.

The competence result is held locally.

The rostering system continues to treat the employee as available for medicine rounds because it only receives the course-completion status.

The digital workflow has confused learning activity with permission to practise.

A connected model would distinguish between:

• training assigned;
• training completed;
• practical assessment;
• competence confirmed;
• restrictions applied;
• and review due.

The source determining whether an employee may perform a high-risk activity must be clear.

Otherwise, the rota may create an unsafe assignment using technically accurate but operationally incomplete information.

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Interoperability Without the Jargon

Interoperability means different systems can exchange and use information safely.

It is not simply the ability to export a spreadsheet or email a PDF.

True interoperability requires agreement about:

• the information being shared;
• how it is structured;
• what each field means;
• which system sends it;
• which system receives it;
• how identity is matched;
• how updates are handled;
• who is authorised to see it;
• and what happens when the transfer fails.

NHS England maintains nationally recognised information standards for health and adult social care. Its interoperability guidance explains that standards provide a common mechanism through which systems and suppliers can exchange information reliably.

The government’s digital framework also encourages providers to use assured solutions that meet baseline requirements for security and interoperability and to work towards safe information sharing across health and care.

Providers do not need to become technical architects.

But they need to ask better procurement and governance questions.

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Data Standards Matter Because Words Can Mean Different Things

Two systems may both contain a field labelled “mobility.”

One may record:

• independent;
• assisted;
• hoist required.

Another may record:

• low risk;
• medium risk;
• high risk.

A third may contain detailed free text.

Even if the systems can technically connect, the information may not translate safely.

Data standards define how important information should be structured and understood.

They can cover:

• identity;
• contacts;
• health conditions;
• medicines;
• care needs;
• risks;
• communication;
• outcomes;
• and other core elements of care.

Standards do not require every provider to deliver identical care.

They create consistency in how essential information is recorded and exchanged.

The national direction is towards shared standards and interoperable systems capable of supporting joined-up health and social care records.

For providers, the practical benefit is simple:

Information should keep the same meaning when it moves.

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Shared Care Records and the Provider’s Role

NHS England’s ambition is for authorised health and care professionals to have access to a more comprehensive view of the person’s record, with integrated care plans shared across NHS, social care and other relevant services.

Shared care records are being developed across England to support this direction.

Adult social care has an important contribution to make.

Care providers often hold detailed, current information about:

• daily function;
• nutrition;
• hydration;
• mobility;
• sleep;
• cognition;
• behaviour;
• emotional wellbeing;
• social isolation;
• and subtle changes that may appear before a crisis.

Digital Care Hub’s May 2026 neighbourhood-health briefing notes that this day-to-day insight places social care in a strong position to support prevention and earlier intervention. It also identifies interoperability and better information sharing as essential foundations for more coordinated neighbourhood care.

But participation brings responsibility.

Information shared externally must be:

• accurate;
• relevant;
• current;
• lawful;
• and understandable.

A provider should not assume that connecting its system automatically makes all its information suitable for wider use.

Poor data becomes more dangerous when it travels further.

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Integration Does Not Remove Information-Governance Responsibilities

Connecting systems can improve care.

It can also widen the number of people, suppliers and platforms involved in handling sensitive information.

Providers need to understand:

• what data is shared;
• why it is shared;
• the lawful basis;
• who receives it;
• how access is controlled;
• how long information is retained;
• how errors are corrected;
• and how people are informed.

The system connection should follow a clearly defined care or operational need.

“Because the platforms can connect” is not a sufficient reason.

The provider should also consider whether the person has:

• been given appropriate privacy information;
• understood how their information is used;
• had communication needs accommodated;
• and been supported to exercise applicable rights.

Joined-up information should improve person-centred care.

It should not make the person feel that their life has become visible to an undefined network of systems and organisations.

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The Importance of Identity Matching

Before information can be exchanged, systems must be confident they are referring to the same person.

Common identifiers may include:

• NHS number;
• date of birth;
• full name;
• address;
• local reference numbers;
• or provider-specific identifiers.

Small discrepancies can create serious consequences.

Examples include:

• two people with similar names;
• an old address remaining on one system;
• a missing middle name;
• duplicate profiles;
• or information attached to the wrong service location.

Providers should monitor:

• duplicate records;
• failed matches;
• manual overrides;
• and data rejected during transfer.

Automation can move information rapidly.

It can also move it rapidly to the wrong place if identity is not assured.

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Who Owns the Update?

A connected system can still fail when accountability is unclear.

Imagine a GP medication change becomes visible through an external connection.

Who is responsible for:

• acknowledging it;
• checking the instruction;
• updating the care plan;
• confirming the eMAR;
• informing relevant staff;
• and monitoring the person?

The technology may make the information available.

It does not automatically create operational ownership.

Every important data flow should therefore have:

• a trigger;
• a responsible role;
• a required response;
• a timeframe;
• and an escalation route.

Providers should avoid generic responsibilities such as:

“The team will review updates.”

A stronger arrangement would state:

“The senior on duty reviews incoming clinical information at the start of every shift. Medication changes are reconciled before the next administration and escalated to the registered manager where information is incomplete or conflicting.”

Integration succeeds when information arrives and action follows.

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Connected Systems Can Spread Poor Information Faster

Interoperability is often presented as an uncomplicated good.

Its benefits are considerable.

But connection can magnify weakness.

An inaccurate allergy status entered once may flow into several systems.

A wrongly selected risk category may appear across multiple dashboards.

A duplicate person record may trigger inappropriate alerts.

A data-quality problem that once remained local can become distributed.

Providers therefore need controls for:

• validation;
• reconciliation;
• audit trails;
• correction;
• and withdrawal of incorrect information.

The question should not only be:

Can the systems exchange data?

It should also be:

How do we know the exchanged data remains safe to use?

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What Should Providers Ask Before Buying Another System?

A new platform should not be assessed only by the features shown during a demonstration.

Providers should examine how it fits into the complete digital estate.

1. What information will this system hold?

Define the data clearly.

2. Which system is already holding it?

Identify duplication before purchasing.

3. Which platform will remain the authoritative source?

Avoid creating competing master records.

4. What integrations are available now?

Distinguish live capability from a future product roadmap.

5. How does the integration work?

Ask whether it is:

• real-time;
• scheduled;
• one-way;
• two-way;
• or dependent on manual export.

6. Which standards does it support?

Ask how the supplier aligns with recognised health and adult social care standards.

7. How are errors identified?

Understand what happens when:

• data fails to transfer;
• records cannot be matched;
• or two systems conflict.

8. Can data be retrieved and transferred?

The provider should understand export formats, costs and timescales before signing the contract.

9. What happens when the supplier changes the integration?

Responsibilities, notification periods and testing should be clear.

10. What outcome should improve?

Do not introduce a system simply because integration sounds modern.

Define the care, workforce or governance problem first.

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The Exit Plan Matters as Much as the Implementation Plan

Providers frequently examine:

• implementation;
• training;
• support;
• and licence cost.

They may pay less attention to what happens when the contract ends.

A system may contain years of:

• care plans;
• daily records;
• medicines data;
• incident history;
• audit trails;
• and quality evidence.

The provider should understand:

• who owns the information;
• how it will be exported;
• whether attachments are included;
• whether the data remains readable;
• how long access continues;
• the cost of extraction;
• and how information will be imported into a replacement platform.

An integration strategy that traps information within one supplier does not create genuine organisational resilience.

Data portability should be considered from the beginning.

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Integration Needs Clinical and Care Safety Oversight

Connecting two systems changes the way information reaches employees and influences decisions.

That change can create new safety risks.

For example:

• a field may be truncated;
• an alert may not transfer;
• units may be interpreted differently;
• a free-text note may not appear;
• or information may arrive without the context needed to use it safely.

NHS England’s interoperability guidance identifies clinical-risk-management standards for the manufacture and deployment of health IT systems and stresses that risks arising from new or modified digital systems must be actively managed.

Adult social care providers should apply the same practical principle even where the formal application of particular standards depends on the system and setting:

• identify possible harm;
• test the workflow;
• involve frontline users;
• document controls;
• and monitor what happens after launch.

An integration should not go live simply because the technical connection worked in a demonstration.

It should be tested within real care scenarios.

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What Should Boards and Nominated Individuals See?

Digital integration should appear within provider governance.

Boards, owners and nominated individuals should understand:

• which systems are critical;
• which systems exchange data;
• which important processes remain manual;
• where duplicate information exists;
• who owns each source;
• how data quality is checked;
• which integrations have failed;
• and what effect fragmentation is having on care and management time.

Useful governance indicators may include:

• duplicate records;
• unresolved data mismatches;
• failed transfers;
• manual reconciliations;
• access errors;
• delayed updates;
• incidents linked to information failure;
• incomplete system interfaces;
• supplier performance;
• and time spent producing combined reports.

Leaders should also ask:

1. Which single data failure could create the greatest harm?
2. Where are employees entering the same information repeatedly?
3. Which system do staff trust most—and why?
4. Where do unofficial spreadsheets remain essential?
5. What happens when two systems disagree?
6. Can we trace an important update from source to action?
7. Are integrations tested after software updates?
8. Can we retrieve all information if a supplier fails?
9. Are people aware of how information moves?
10. What measurable benefit has each connection produced?

These questions move digital oversight beyond licence renewals and uptime figures.

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What Should Providers Expect from Digital Partners?

The integration challenge creates an important role for:

• digital social care record suppliers;
• eMAR providers;
• rostering and workforce platforms;
• software-integration specialists;
• managed IT providers;
• data-migration experts;
• shared-care-record programmes;
• information-governance advisers;
• and digital-transformation consultants.

But providers should expect more than a technical connection.

A credible partner should be able to explain:

• which information will move;
• why it needs to move;
• which system remains authoritative;
• how data quality will be protected;
• how failures will be identified;
• what staff need to do differently;
• who supports the interface;
• and which outcome should improve.

That outcome may be:

• fewer transcription errors;
• faster medicine reconciliation;
• less duplicated entry;
• improved handover;
• quicker escalation;
• stronger reporting;
• reduced management time;
• or better continuity for people.

The most valuable integration will often be the one employees barely notice because it removes work and makes the right information available naturally.

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A 30-Day Connected-Information Review

Providers do not need to begin with an expensive integration project.

They can first understand how information currently moves.

Week 1: Map the digital estate

List every system used for:

• people;
• care;
• medicines;
• workforce;
• incidents;
• finance;
• communication;
• and reporting.

Record:

• the owner;
• supplier;
• contract;
• users;
• information held;
• and existing integrations.

Week 2: Follow five critical information journeys

Choose information such as:

• medication change;
• hospital discharge;
• new safeguarding risk;
• employee competence change;
• serious incident.

Trace every system, handover and person involved.

Identify:

• duplication;
• delay;
• manual entry;
• missing ownership;
• and potential failure points.

Week 3: Identify the authoritative source

For each critical dataset, agree:

• where the correct record should live;
• who maintains it;
• which systems receive it;
• and how conflicts are resolved.

Week 4: Select three improvements

These might include:

• removing one duplicate spreadsheet;
• establishing a formal reconciliation process;
• connecting two systems;
• improving a handover;
• standardising identifiers;
• correcting a reporting definition;
• or beginning a supplier-integration review.

Define the result expected from each action.

The objective is not to connect everything immediately.

It is to make the most important information safer first.

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Ten Questions Care Leaders Should Be Asking

1. Which systems currently hold the same information?
2. Which one is the authoritative record?
3. How quickly do important changes reach every person who needs them?
4. Where are employees manually copying information?
5. What happens when systems present conflicting records?
6. Can an incident be followed through to care-plan, workforce and governance action?
7. Are our dashboards built from consistently defined measures?
8. Which integrations are genuinely live, and which remain manual?
9. Can we retrieve and transfer our complete data if a supplier changes?
10. What care risk has connected information reduced?

The last question prevents integration from becoming a technology project without a care outcome.

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What Does Connected Digital Care Look Like?

Connected care does not mean every employee sees every piece of information.

Access should remain appropriate to role, purpose and consent.

It means:

• the right information reaches the right person;
• at the right time;
• in a form they can understand;
• through a secure and dependable route;
• with clear responsibility for acting on it.

A connected provider can show that:

• care and medicines information remain aligned;
• significant updates flow reliably;
• staff access current guidance;
• incidents trigger wider learning;
• workforce competence informs deployment;
• managers trust their dashboards;
• external information is reconciled safely;
• and people experience greater continuity.

Technology should reduce the distance between information and action.

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One Person, One Story, One Reliable View

A person receiving care should not have to repeat their life to every new professional.

They should not be placed at risk because one system knew something another did not.

They should not receive different support according to which record an employee happened to open.

And they should not become responsible for correcting the gaps between organisations.

The ambition for shared health and care information is ultimately human.

It is about helping people experience joined-up support rather than a series of disconnected services.

For care providers, that work starts internally.

Before an organisation can participate confidently in wider integrated records and neighbourhood services, it needs to understand its own information.

It needs to know:

• where the truth lives;
• how it moves;
• who owns it;
• and what happens when it changes.

Digital adoption gave providers more systems.

The next phase must create better connection between them.

Because when care information is fragmented, risk increases quietly.

A medicine change waits in one platform.

A new concern remains inside another.

A manager combines figures manually.

A staff member fills the gap through memory.

Each individual workaround may appear manageable.

Together, they create an operating model that depends too heavily on people repairing the technology around them.

One version of the truth does not require one supplier or one platform.

It requires clear authority, reliable standards, safe exchange and accountable action.

The objective is not connected technology for its own sake.

It is connected care.

Better information.

Better decisions.

Reduced risk.

And stronger outcomes for the person at the centre of every system.

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Frequently Asked Questions

What is interoperability in adult social care?

Interoperability is the ability of different digital systems to exchange and use information safely and consistently. It requires common standards, suitable technology and agreements governing how data is shared.

Does one version of the truth mean using one software system?

No. Providers can use several specialist systems. One version of the truth means knowing which platform is authoritative for each important type of information and ensuring other systems receive consistent, controlled updates.

Why are disconnected care systems risky?

They can create duplicated records, delayed updates, conflicting information, manual transcription, unclear accountability and unreliable management reporting. These weaknesses can affect medicines, care planning, staffing, incidents and transitions between services.

What are data standards?

Data standards define how information is recorded, structured and exchanged so that different systems interpret it consistently. National standards support interoperability across health and adult social care.

What is a shared care record?

A shared care record brings relevant information from different health and care organisations together so authorised professionals can access a more comprehensive view of the person. Shared care records are being implemented across England.

Should every care-provider system be integrated?

Not necessarily. Integration should follow a clear care, safety, workforce or operational need. Providers should prioritise the information flows where delay, duplication or error creates the greatest risk.

What should providers ask software suppliers about integration?

Providers should ask what data can be exchanged, which standards are supported, whether transfers are real-time or scheduled, how errors are identified, who supports the interface and how complete data can be exported when the contract ends.

Can connected systems create new risks?

Yes. Incorrect information can spread between systems, records can be mismatched and important context can be lost during transfer. Providers need validation, audit trails, reconciliation and clear action ownership.

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Editorial sources

This feature has been developed using evidence available by 22 June 2026, preserving the integrity of its backdated publication position.

• Department of Health and Social Care, Adult Social Care Provider Statistics, England: Quarterly Update to May 2026, published 4 June 2026.
• Department of Health and Social Care, Findings from the 2025 Adult Social Care Provider Technology Survey, published 6 March 2026.
• Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England, Digital Working in Adult Social Care: What Good Looks Like.
• NHS England, Interoperability.
• NHS England, Joining Up and Sharing Health and Care Data.
• NHS England, Shared Care Records: The Wider Context.
• Digital Care Hub, Neighbourhood Health and Social Care Data: Policy Briefing, published 27 May 2026.
• Care Quality Commission, Digital Record Systems: Achieving Good Outcomes for People Using Adult Social Care Services.
• Care Quality Commission, Electronic Medicines Administration Records in Adult Social Care.